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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
JOSE\PH VAUGHN MAYNE,

Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden, Utah
State Prison,

11922

Respondent-Appellee.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a denial of a writ of h:aJbeas
corpus challenging the validity of two prior felony convictions.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court, after an evidentiary hearing, entered
judgment denying the petition for hrubeas corpus.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent prays that this Court will affimi the
findings and order of the court below.
STATEMENT OF FkCTS
The respondent desires to present his own ·statemenlt of
the facts in th:is case.

2

On August 1, 1960, the appellant was convicted (case
number 17001) and sentenced to the State Prison pursuant
to his plea of guilty to :the crime of issuing a fictitious
check (R. 10). He had appointed counsel during this proceeding (R. 10). He was seventeen years of age at this
time ( T. 4) and as a consequence a stay of execution was
granted and he was placed on probation (R. 10). Subsequently, his probation was improperly revoked as stipulated
to by the respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings below (R. 37).
On July 25, 1961, the appellant was again convicted
(case number 17 533) and sentenced to the Utah State
Prison pursuant to a plea of guilty to a charge of robbery
and grand larceny (R. 9). He waived his right to counsel
at this proceeding ( R. 9) . Both the judge who sentenced
rbhe appellant in :this case and the court reporter are now
deceased: moreover, the shorthand notes of the proceedings cannot be found (R. 31, 32).
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 5 5-10-5 (1953) DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
1

The appellant alleges that Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-5
( 1953) , granting concurrent jurisdiction between district
and juvenile courts in cases involving juveniles fourteen
years of age and older who are charged with having committed a felony, violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendmenit. Further, he contends that dis1
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crimination occurs by reason of the alleged fact that a
prosecutor can dictate whkh court such a juvenile is tried
in simply by bringing the case in the court of his choice.
In Utah, the juvenile court system has been granted
exclusive jurisdiction over juveniles under eighteen years
of age in all cases relating to neglect, dependency and delinquency, Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-5 (1953). The purpose
for such exclusive ju:riisdiction is to provide a substitute
parent (parens patriae) for the juvenile whereby reha;bilitwtkm can be attempted through informal, non-criminal
proceedings. In re Lindh, 11 Utah 2d 385, 359 P. 2d 1058
(1961). However, juvenile courts were not granted exclusive jurisdiction in cases of juveniles fourteen yearis of
age and older who were 'charged with having committed a
felony. In these circumstances, juvenile courts have concurrent jurisdiction wlifill lthe district courts, Utah Code
Ann. § 55-10-5 (2) (1953). Thus, the Utah Legislature has
established a class, i.e., juveniles fourteen yearis of age and
older who are charged with having committed a felony, and
has declared that under certain
persons
within the class may be tried outside the
court
system. The ques1:lion relevanlt :to the equal protection
challenge is whether or not thiis established class is
reasona;ble 1and thus does not result in invidious discrimination, McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (19'64).
1

No doubt the reason for ·concurrent jurisdiction over
this particular dass of j uveni1e is to protect itlhe right of
the state ito prosecute those who commit felonies notwith-
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standing ·the age of :the violator. In McLaughlin, the United
States Supreme Court said that in deciding the reasonablenes-s of an esrta!blci.shed class t!hat:
" ... the legislative judgment ... is given the
benefit of every conceivable circumstance which
might characterize the cla8'sification as reasonable
rather than arbitr:ary and linvidious." 379 U. S. at
191. (Emphasis added.)
The respondent ·submits that the legisfative judgment to
either try a juvenile charged Wi1th the commission of a
felony in either ·the juven:He or district court comports with
the "every conceivable circum-stance" standard enuncialted
in McLaughlin above and thus is not unconstitutional.
Moreover, the basis for deciding whether or not a
member of the class should be tried in the district or juvenile court "is discretionary with the judge of the respecltive
court and not based on the wh'im of the prosecutor as contended by the appellant. For
if a case is brought
in the district court, the judge sitting as a commiitting
magistrate has discretion to bind lbhe case over to the diistrict courit for triial or transfer the ca;se to the
court. The standard i·s whether or not the right of the
State outweighs the probaJbHiJty of rehabilitation in ithe
juvenile system, Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-5(5) (1953). On
the other hand, if the case is first brought in the juvenHe
court, the juvenile judge, at his discretion, may transfer
the case to the district court if in his judgment the right
of the State to prosecute outweighs the probabil1ity of reha'b'il'irtation through the juvenile process. No doubt each
court looks at the prior record of the juvenile, the nialture
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of the crime 'With which he i's charged, the
of
rehabilitation, the age of the juvenile and any and all other
relevant informwtion rthen before the court. In other words,
each court balances its function and interest with that of
the other court. There are not two standards a.s contended
by the appeI'lant.
In addition,
fact thaJt each respective judge has
discretion in the maJtter is not a violation of equal protection, Morrison v. Wa.lker, 404 F. 2d 1046 (9th Cir. 1968);
Segura v. Patterson, 402 F. 2d 249 (loth Cir. 1968).
lit should also be noted 1that all persons in the class

stand in the same position and are treaJted equally. The
appellant makes no showing whatever that certain juvenil&"l in rthe class, based on race, creed, color, etc., arie treated
any d'ifferenrtly than olther members of itJhe class. ' Each
have an equal chance of either being tried in ibhe district or
juvenile court depending on their background and possibility of rehab'ilitation.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear rth!aJt Utah Code
Ann. § 55-10-5 (19 53) doos not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
1

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR
IN FINDING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT IN
CASE NUMBER 17001 CONSIDERED THE
WELFARE OF THE APPELLANT PURSUANT
TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-5(5) (1953).
The appellant contends lthaJt because the court reoord
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does not show the grounds on which the district court
judge, sitting a'S a committing magistrate, bound ithe appellant over to the district com'lt for trial, WM a violation
of due process and thus prejudicial error. This aHegation
standing alone 'is not enough to support appellant's prayer
for relief.
In the memorandum decision of the lower
habeas corpus proceeding, the court found that:

in the

" ... there is no evidence before tthe Court that
the Di strict Judge, sitting as a committing magistrate aated in an arlbitrary or discriminatory manner or that he faHed to make a finding as to the
best interest of the juvenile defendant." (R. 38).
1

This holding must be indulged a presumption of correctness, Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165, 43'5 P. 2d 289
( 1967). Moreover, the burden is on the appellrant to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged procedural error substantially prejudiced his rights, Id. See
also, Syddall v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 263, 437 P. 2d 194
(1968), Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2d 968
(1968), and Workman v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 1, 425 P. 2d
402 ( 1967).
In the instant case, the appellant makes no contention
other than the faot that the r.ecord is barren a'S to the reasons for which the appellanlt WM bound over for trial in
the district court. 'Jlhere :aI'le no affirmative al1egations
that such silence in any way had a "substantial adverse
effeot" on his right. Moreover, the facts support the conclusion that no such prejudice occurred. For example, Utah
1

1
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Code Ann. § 55-10-30 (1953) provides that juveniles convioted in the juvenile court may be placed on probation,
committed to the StaJte Industrial School, etc. The facts
in the instant case show tha!t the appellant in case number
17001 was placed on probation (R. 16) - the same sentence that may have been imposed on him in the juvenile
court. Clearly, appeHanJt's :allegation of error on this point
is without merit in that there was no resulting "substantial adverse effect" on his rights.
The appellant contends that Kent v. United States, 383
U. S. 541 ( 1966) is authority for his argument. In Kent
the Supreme Court reveraed the oonvie!tion of a juvenile
in the District Court of the DiStrict of Columbia on the
grounds that the juvenile court waived its exclusive juriisdiotion over the juv.enile when he had no counsel present
and without
stating in the record rthe basis for
the waiver. The Court reasoned that su0h action by the
juvenile court was a viol.aJtion of due process.
However, the Kent case is not applicable here. In that
cru:;e, the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over
juveniles charged wirth the commission of felonies, 383 U.
S. at 556, while in the instant case, the district and juvenile
courts have concurrent jurisdie!tion over the juvenile. Thus,
one court is not waiving its exclusive jurisdiction in deference to a com:it thaJt did not have jurisdiction in the f.irst
'in Kent. In other words, in
instance as was
the instant case, the appellant had no vested right rto he
tried in the juvenile court in the first instance as did the
juven'ile 1in the Kent case. On the contrary, the appellant
1

8

had the right to be tried in either the district or juvenile
com't depending on the discretion of the judge charged with
making the seleotion. As a consequence, Kent can clearly
be distinguished from the instant case and thus is not authority for the appeHant's contention on this point.

Kent is noit applicable to the case at bar on sifill another ground. Many courts have held that based on the
priinciples of Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719 (1966),
Kent should not be given retroactive application in
that it would disruplt the administration of rbhe criminal
law, In re Harris, 64 Gal. Rptr. 319, 434 P. 2d 615 (1967),
Bouge v. Reed, 459 P. 2d 869 (Or. 1'969) and Stanley v.
Peyton, 292 F. Supp. 209 (W. D. Vir. 1968). Since appellant's conviction was in 1960, (R. 10), and since Kent was
decided in 1966, it is submitted iby ithe respondent ithaJt Kent
should not be applied here. To do so would result in substantial disruption of ithe State's right Ito admi:!1is1ter iits
criminal laws among juvenHes charged with having comm:itted a felony. Thus it is urged that the lower courit 'be
sustained on ithis point.
1

1

POINT III.
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
IS SUFFllCIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING
THAT IN CASE 17533 APPELLANT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY AND UNDERS TAN D I N G LY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
COUNSEL.
The appellant alleges tha;t bemuse the tria:l transcript
in case number 17533 was lost (R. 31, 32), the doctrine
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of Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506 (1962), is applica:ble,
i.e., that a waiver will not be presumed from a silent record.
Therefore, appellant contends that this Court cannot find
that he knowingly, intelligently and understandingly waived
his right Ito counsel notwilthstanding the faot that the
minute entry states that "Defend ant waive8 appointment
of counsel" ( R. 9) .
1

The instant case is clearly distinguished from Cochran.
In that ca:se, the transcript was avaiilable, but there wais
no recitation of an offer to appo inted counsel. Moreover,
the record was silent on the waiver of counsel issue. However, in the instant cru;e .the tmnscript is lost, but the record is not s ilent, the minute entry states ithalt the appellant
wa'ived
Irt iis nort known, however, wh:ether or not
the transcript contains dialogue which would support the
minute entry; thus, Cochran is not applicable here so Utah
law must be :loowed to in deciding the issue.
1

1

1

In Utah, minute enrtr'ies are prima focie evidence of
the facts so staited in criminal cases, State v. Cano, 64 Utah
87, 89-99, 228 P. 563 (1924). In State v. Trimming, 406
P. 2d 118 (Ida. 1965) rthe Idaho Supreme Court saiid:

"Prima facie evidence ... is such evi:i.dence as in
the judgment of th'e 1law is sufficient to estaJblish
guilt and ff credilted by the finder of tthe facts, it is
sufficienlt for that purpose, unless rebutted or the
contrary proved." Id. art 125.
'Dhe appellant makes no allegations, nor did Ire present evidence in ithe court below, which tended to show that he did
not properly waive counsel. He mere'ly contends that waiver
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cannot be presumed from a '.Silent record. Thus, the appellant has not successfully rebutted the pl"ima facie evidence
estalJlished from the minute entry, and that alone, according to Trimming, is enough to sustain the finding of the
trial court.
In addition, the lower court can be sustained on yet
another ground. The Cochran case is not as limited as the
appellant argues. It does not narrowly stand for the proposition that a S'ilent record ipso focto must result in a court
finding agaJinst a constitutional waiver. Rather, the Court
in Cochran slta:tes :
"The record must show or there must be an
allegation and evidence which show, that an accused

was offered counsel but intell!igenitly and understandingly rejected the offer." 369 U. S. at 516.
(Emphasis added.)

The respondenrt submits, and alleged in the court below,
that appellant voluntariily waived his right to counsel (R.
30), and '.Subsequently, at the hearing, based on cross examination of the appellant, presented ev1idence that the
appellant did in facit know of his right to count.Se} and pursuant to that knowledge volunrtJarily and understandingly
waived the same.
On cross examination, page 78 of the hearing transci:'ipt, the app'eHant 1admitted thaJt he had appointed counsel
in 1960 on the fic'tit!i<Yus check charge (case number 17001).
Therefore, it seems somewhat suspect that the next year,
1961, on the robbery and grand larcency charge (case number 17'533), that he could reasonaJbly argue that he wais un-
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aware of his right to appointed counsel. In Brown v.
Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 P. 2<l 968 (1968), this count
held rtihaJt the past experience of one contending a violation
of his consti.turtional rights could be looked to by the trial
court in disposing of ithe
Later, on page 89 of the transcript, after again having
admiltited thaJt he had been represented by appointed counsel
in case number 17001, appellant stated, regarding case
number 17533:
1

QUESTION: So that you d'id know you had a
right to counsel, even though you didn't stop Ibo
think about it?
ANSWER: WeH, I suppose I did.
In the light of all !the testimony before rbhe lower court,
rthe judge found :
"That peltirtioner's testimony is vague and
sketchy as to h'is cla'im thaJt he was nolt able to make
an fotelligenlt waiver of counsel in regard to case
No. 17533 ... " (R. 38).
In State v. Knepper, 18 Utah 2d 215, 418 P. 2d 780 (1966),
this court concluded:
"Where the trial was to the court, he had rthe
same exclusive prerogaitives of judging the credihi'lity of lthe evidence and of finding rthe facts ais normally belongs to the jury." 18 Utah 2d at 218.
It is the respondent's contention that the lower court
correotly found thait the appellanlt had in fact 'Waived counsel in case number 17533; thaJt there is sufficient evidence
in the recx;>rd and ,the minute entries to so flind notwtilth-
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standing the loss of the trial transcript; that the lower
court judge did not abuse his discretion in so fiinding; that
the f1ind'ing iis presumed correct unless the appellant can
overcome that presumption; this, we submit, was not done.
POINT IV.
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY IN CASE
NUMBER 17533 WAS NOT COE'RCED OR INDUCED; RATHER, IT WAS VOLUNTARILY,
UNDERSTANDINGLY AND INTELLIGENTLY
GIVEN.
The appellant!; contends that his plea of guilty in case
number 17533 was cO'erced by promises of probation from
certafo police officers. However, he was unable to name
the dfficers involved (T. 90). Moreover, he testified that
the presiding judge had not promised him probation (T.
89) nor had the district attorney ( T. 90) .
In Hanks v. State, 18 Uitah 2d 101, 417 P. 2d 118
(1966), a case wherein an identical contention wais made,
this Court summarily dismissed .the argument on the
grounds that the petiJtioner could not iidentify the aHeged
officers who promiS'ed probaJtion, 18 Utah 2d ait 102.
As in the Hanks case, the appellan't'1s cornbention here
is not sufficient to overcome ithe presumption of validity
indulged the 'lower court, Maxwell v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d
163, 435 P. 2d 287 (1967). There is no evidence in /the
record which tends Ito support the appellant's position. As
staJted in the memorandum decision:
" ... His (appellant's) testimony is even more
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vague as to his claim that the plea of guHJty was
obtained on the "promtise" of a police officer of
probation. He 'was unable to idenJtify even generally
the police officer who made such promise."

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, it is th€ respondent's conltenrtion that appeNant's comstitutional rights were not violarted
in any way and thus the respondent prays that this Court
will affirm the court below.
Respecitf ully submiitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol

Salt Lak€ City, Utah 84'114

Attorneys for Respondent

